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Abstract 
The relationship and interaction of military spending and economic growth have been theoretically 
and empirically investigated since the 1970s but is still cannot provide conclusive evidence towards 
the direction and the quantification of the impact between the two magnitudes. The use of different 
data sets in terms of time periods, and number and geographic location of countries, different 
theoretical background leading to different econometric specifications, and single type of 
econometric methodology make any comparison impossible. This paper looks into the dynamic 
interaction between military spending and economic growth during the period 1988-2013 that 
includes the recent years of economic crisis covering 138 countries without making any prior 
assumptions about the theoretical channels of influence, whilst not limited to a single estimation 
method but employing a wide range of methodologies in order to form a complete picture of the 
long- and short-run interaction. Furthermore, as such interaction might not be linear, we create 
three groups of countries based on the countries’ income developmental stage. Overall we find no 
evidence of long- and short-run causality from the military spending to economic growth except for 
the developing countries (positive in the long-run). However, from economic growth to military 
spending we find positive impact for all groups except the least developed countries. We also notice 
the interaction was more prominent prior to the start of the economic crisis. 
 
JEL classification: C33; H56; O40; O57 
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1. Introduction 
Military spending has been steadily reducing over the last decades from a worldwide country 
average closer to 4% of GDP in the 1980s to 2.3% of GDP in 2013 but it still consumes a significant 
share of global resources with the overall level of military spending being close to 1.7 trillion U.S. 
dollars (in constant 2005 prices). 2013 was the first year to experience a military spending reduction 
(of 2.4%) since 1998. Overall, during the years after the cold-war ended military spending was 
decreasing but it literally doubled since 1998. The increase was particularly pronounced among 
larger economies, both developing and developed, with the lion’s share belonging to the developed 
countries (69% of the total military spending in 1990, 87% in 2000 and 91% or more since 2006) and 
the U.S. leading the way (around 35% of the total military expenditure).  The developing countries 
spend well over 3.5% of their GDP in military related expenses and at the same time the least 
developed countries on the average are reducing this type of spending to below 2% as percentage of 
their GDP especially after the start of the economic crisis. The level of military spending is influenced 
by international factors and events, like foreign policy objectives, exogenous real or perceived 
threats, armed conflict or military alliances and policies to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping 
operation as well as domestic reasons. The decision to authorise spending for national defence is the 
result of the central government’s allocation process of public spending among competing objectives 
that are served by the government. Hence, military spending is expected to influence a country’s 
economic growth via a variety of channels. On one hand, the military expenditure is frequently 
viewed as unproductive public expenditure or ‘crowding-out’ other public spending that are 
considered more effectively contributing to economic development or competing with civilian 
activities for labour, capital and other production related resources and subsequently distorting the 
demand and the resulting market price for them, and hence, it is expected to undermine economic 
growth. On the other hand, military spending could promote economic growth by stimulating 
aggregate demand for goods and services and reducing excess capacity (‘military Keynesianism’), or 
through ‘spillover effects’ from military research and development (R&D) of technologically 
advanced products to civilian spin-off products.  
The literature on the interaction of military spending and economic growth dates back in the 
1970s with the Benoit Hypothesis (Benoit, 1973, 1978), that military spending stimulates the 
economic growth rate, being tested numerous times. However, the empirical results since then have 
been inconclusive and rather confusing with the interaction between military spending and 
economic growth and the direction of the influence between these magnitudes being one-way or 
mutual, positive or negative or absent depending on the set of countries under study, the sample 
period, the theoretical channels linking these two magnitudes and/or the applied econometric 
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methodology. A great number of studies use cross sectional country based data and hence ignore 
the impact of time which might result to biased outcomes as well as their contribution is limited to 
the historic length of the sample period. The remaining majority of studies focuses on a specific 
country or a pair of countries or a narrow geographic area with preference to developing countries 
and thus they cannot be compared as they refer not only to different countries but also to 
frequently different time periods. Therefore, most of the existing studies have limited universal 
application with even more time-limited relevance. A few recent papers have used more broad data 
sets and applied panel data estimation techniques (Kollias et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2011; Chen et 
al., 2014) contributing significantly to the debate but also adding some contradictory results (e.g. 
Chang et al. (2011) find that there is a negative influence from military spending to economic growth 
whilst Chen et al. (2014) find no causality for the European region) and in general not producing 
comparable results due to either the investigation of different set of countries in their data samples 
and/or the use a different econometric specifications and estimation techniques. Furthermore, the 
time periods in these papers do not capture the most recent years of the economic downturn. The 
inclusion of the most recent time period in the analysis becomes more significant as the prevailing 
view over the last decade is that there is high opportunity cost in the military spending especially for 
the hardest hit countries by the financial crisis. Additionally, the vast majority of the studies that 
look to more than a pair or a small group of countries look only on the causality of military spending 
on the economic growth and ignore that a reverse relationship might also hold. Finally, the 
comparison of the findings might be not be feasible due to the use of different data sources and 
different definitions of military spending. 
The question of interest in this paper is whether and to what extent the military spending 
dynamically interacts with the economic growth on a global scale without any prior assumption 
about the channels of such interaction that might affect our findings. We employ a worldwide 
sample of 138 countries covering the period 1988-2013 including the recent years of the global 
economic turmoil that might have changed the priorities in government spending. In order to obtain 
a clear and complete picture of the dynamics of such relationship over time we research both the 
long-run and short-run bi-directional causality. We investigate whether a long-run relationship exists 
using a wide range of panel co-integration methodologies for robustness including quantifying the 
impact where possible using the standard Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) estimation 
technique, the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) and the Pesaran (1999) pooled mean 
group estimation (PMG). Unlike the vast majority of the literature that investigate only the direction 
of influence from military spending to economic growth, we research the reverse interaction as 
economic growth might influence the decision to finance military spending, which will serve a 
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country’s foreign policy targets and defence needs. We also look into the short-run causality in both 
directions using Granger causality tests along with the PMG methodology. Additionally, as the 
relationship between economic growth and military spending might not be linear (Barro, 1990) due 
to income developmental stage potentially influencing the outcome of the analysis, we repeat the 
above investigation for developed, developing and least developed group of countries following the 
World Bank classification (WDI, 2015). Finally, we repeat the above analysis for the 1988-2006 
period, as this time span is closer to the period that is researched in the recent literature and it 
allows us to have a more complete view for this time interval as well to detect any changes that 
might have been introduced by the recent economic crisis. 
The paper continues with a brief review of the related literature in section 2, followed by a 
description of our model, data and the estimation methodologies employed in this paper in section 
3. Next, in section 4 we present the empirical evidence of our analysis and finally, the implications 
and main conclusions are presented in section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The mutual influence between military expenditure and economic growth has received 
considerable empirical attention, and while their relation is far from established, our knowledge 
about this interaction is becoming more extensive. During the period 1969-1981, that was 
characterised by a more relaxed tension relative to the previous years in the global power 
confrontation arena, the military expenditure increased by 2.9% for members in the Warsaw Pact 
and by 0.5% for OECD countries whilst by 11.2% for developing countries (Looney, 1988). Hence, the 
initial question in the literature was whether public spending in the defence area has a positive 
impact on the economic growth especially for the developing and less-developed countries. The first 
notable attempt to investigate this was the work by Benoit (1973, 1978), which found a positive 
impact of defence spending on economic growth for a group of less-developed countries and was 
later referred as the ‘Benoit Hypothesis’. However, the applied econometric techniques were not 
satisfactory and that spurred an extensive interest on the area. Most of the studies that followed 
focused on studying the 1960s and 1970s and in general they found that the military spending was 
more beneficial for the richest countries with no significant impact as the per capita income was 
reduced and even negative impact for the less privileged countries (Feder, 1983; Frederiksen and 
Looney, 1982; Lim, 1983; Biswas and Ram, 1986) but the results did not hold if other factors are 
taken into account (Deger and Smith, 1983; Faini et al., 1984; Deger, 1986; Joerding, 1986).  
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Subsequent studies that used more years in their sample offered a diversity of findings whilst 
the assumed channels of influence between military spending and economic growth and the 
assumed underlying school of thought (neoclassical, keynesian, institutionalist, marxist) steered the 
outcome of the studies. The neoclassical approach sees the military spending as a public good and 
the economic effects of the military expenditure will be determined by its opportunity cost and the 
effectiveness of spending on alternative causes. The keynesian approach views military spending as 
one aspect of state spending that increases output through multiplier effects in the presence of 
ineffective aggregate demand. The Institutionalist approach combines the keynesian perspective 
with the viewpoint of military spending spurring industrial inefficiencies as well as maintaining a 
powerful interest group composed of individuals, firms and organisations who benefit from defence 
spending regardless of the country’s actual needs. Finally, the marxist approach sees the role of 
military spending as necessary in capitalist development and prevention of stagnation, whilst it is 
considered a wasteful way for lack of creating any further output in the society and for enhancing 
class struggle through the presence of the interest group mentioned by the institutionalists. Positive 
effects of military expenditure on economic growth through human capital accumulation or spin-off 
technologies was found by Weede (1983), Deger and Sen (1983), Deger (1986), and Yakovlev (2007), 
whilst through the process of enhancing infrastructure, promoting full employment, and increasing a 
Keynesian-type aggregate demand was found by Kennedy (1983), DeGrasse (1983), and Mueller and 
Atesoglu (1993). Negative effects of military expenditure on economic growth were found when 
alternative channels were investigated like through reducing the savings rate, crowding out 
investment in new capital stock, health and education and increasing tax burden with greater impact 
on resource restraint countries (see e.g., Smith, 1980; Cappelen et al., 1984; Mintz and Huang (1990, 
1991), and Ward and Davis (1992), Batchelor et al., 2000; Dunne et al., 2001). Finally, there is 
another group of studies that imply that there is no relationship between the two variables mainly 
when the military expenditures are low (see e.g. Alexander, 1990; Kinsella, 1990; Payne and Ross, 
1992; Ward et al., 1992; DeRouen, 1994; Pierroni, 2009; Dritsakis, 2004). It should be noted that 
almost all articles were researching only the influence of military spending on economic growth and 
not the potential reverse causality. 
As Mitz and Stevenson (1995) first argued, the diversity of results is mainly due to the use of 
alternative channels of interaction between the two magnitudes, and the research methodology. On 
that front, there are studies that focus on one country (e.g. d' Agostino et al. (2011) and Kollias and 
Paleologou (2013) studied the U.S.) or a small group of countries (e.g. Dritsakis (2004) studied 
Greece and Turkey; Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003) reviewed Egypt, Israel and Syria), or a certain 
geographical region with homogeneous countries (e.g. Dunne and Mohammed (1995) selected 13 
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Sub-Saharan countries; Landau (1996) focused on 17 wealthy OECD countries; Dakurah H. et al. 
(2000) investigated 62 developing countries; Wijeweera and Webb (2011) looked into the case of 
South Asia). Additionally, the vast majority of studies use cross country-sectional data that limits the 
validity of the findings to the period under study as well as they might introduce bias due to the 
heterogeneity of the countries when the sample contains diverse type of countries. The studies that 
used time series models have also problems with low power of estimation as the data time span was 
rather small. The first study to avoid these problems and utilize panel data was by Mitz and 
Stevenson (1995) who found that military expenditure leads to positive economic growth in less 
than 10% of the 103 countries in their sample. However, only a small volume of the recent literature 
has been using panel data: Ram (2003) used a sample of 119 countries, Yildirim et al. (2005) focused 
on Middle Eastern countries, Kollias C. et al. (2007) investigated 15 EU members, Chang H. et al. 
(2011) utilized a dataset of 90 countries, Chen et al. (2014) analyzed 137 countries. To make matters 
more complicated, the time span used in the various studies is not the same, whilst frequently the 
cold war era is blended with more recent data. Furthermore, all analyses stop before the recent 
economic crisis. Finally, most of the literature constructs and estimates a regression type model with 
the economic growth as the dependent variable and the military expenses as an explanatory 
variable, or very few investigate the bi-directional relationship either by studying each direction 
separately or by creating a system of equations, including a second equation with the military 
expenses as the dependent variable and the economic growth as an explanatory variable. Thus, they 
focus on the long run relationship but with a limited specification. Moreover, there have been only a 
few studies that look into the short run relationship using Granger causality tests (e.g. Joerding, 
1986; Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003; Chang et. al., 2011) but they have been criticized for their 
contribution being limited to the period under study as well as for difficulty in interpreting their 
results as they were not connected with any theory. Finally, there have been arguments about the 
non-linearity of the relationship between the two magnitudes, but the complexity of these models 
did not make them popular among researchers and when they were applied they focused on a small 
number of states (eg. Barro, 1990; Cuaresma and Reitschuler, 2004). 
As it is not possible to cover all areas of the extensive existing literature, more thorough military-
growth literature surveys and be found in Ram (2003), Dunne and Uye (2010) and Dunne and Tian 
(2013). Dunne and Tian (2013) cover almost 170 studies and they argue that the more recent studies 
that are focusing in the post-cold war era provide stronger evidence of a negative effect of military 
expenditure on economic growth with the developing countries to benefit the most if their military 
expenditure is reduced. More specifically they state that 53% of the post-cold war cross-country 
studies find negative relationship, 19% positive relationship and 28% have unclear results whilst the 
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vast majority of the case studies find positive impact when conflict pairs like Greece-Turkey and 
India-Pakistan are in focus. Finally, according to the meta-analysis by Awaworyi and Yew (2014) 
when positive effects of military expenditure on growth are present, they are more pronounced for 
developed countries than less developed countries. However, one should be cautious when studies’ 
findings are aggregated as some countries and geographic areas are more popular than others for 
reasons of data availability and potential conflicts. Overall, as it can been seen from the above 
discussion the divergence of the time span and the selected countries in the data samples, the 
underlying assumptions about the channels of influence between military spending and economic 
growth that result to different econometric specifications as well as the variety and sometimes 
inadequate estimation methodology does not provide us with a clear picture of their interaction.  
 
3. Data, Model and Estimation Methodology 
The aim of this study is to provide a clear picture of the dynamic interaction between the 
military expenditure and economic growth and the direction of this interaction on a worldwide basis 
whilst looking into both their long-run and short-run relationship without being limited to one type 
of econometric specification and without adopting any a priori hypothesis on the theoretical 
background of such relationship.  
One of the main reasons behind the adverse findings regarding the relationship between military 
spending and economic growth in the existing literature is the frequently limited selection of 
countries as well as the time span of the sample. In this study we use data for 138 countries for the 
period 1988-2013, which were extracted from the World Development Index (WDI, 2015) of the 
World Bank. The data sample contains all countries with available data that they also represent 93% 
of the measured worldwide GDP providing us with an almost worldwide coverage. The time period 
of the sample covers the post-cold war era that contains over 26 years of information since the 
thawing of cold war including the more recent years of economic crisis. As none of the existing 
studies research beyond 2006 and the economic crisis forced the hardest hit countries by the crisis 
to cut their government spending including their military spending, it becomes important to look 
into the potential impact of the economic crisis. Also, the use of panel data allows us to control for 
country specific effects and to incorporate such information over time. Military spending was 
constructed as the logarithm of the per capita Military Expenditure (MSP), whilst economic growth is 
the logarithm of the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) both in 2005 constant U.S. dollars.  
The use of a large number of countries introduces heterogeneity in the model as according to 
Barro (1990) the relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth may be non-linear 
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(most probably U-shaped) with different levels of income influencing the causality between the two 
magnitudes. To alleviate this problem, we divide our countries into three smaller panels groups 
based on their income development level based on the World Bank classification: Developed (51 
countries), Developing (59 countries), and Least Developed (28 countries). Table 1 displays the list of 
countries in each group. 
Table 1: List of countries – grouping is based on their income development stage 
Developed countries (51) Developing countries (59) 
Least Developed 
countries (28) 
Argentina Korea, Rep. Albania Lebanon Angola 
Australia Lithuania United Arab Emirates Libya Burundi 
Austria Luxembourg Armenia Sri Lanka Burkina Faso 
Belgium Latvia Azerbaijan Morocco Bangladesh 
Bulgaria Moldova Bahrain Mongolia Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mexico Belize Mauritius Djibouti 
Belarus Macedonia, FYR Bolivia Malaysia Ethiopia 
Brazil Malta Brunei Darussalam Namibia Guinea 
Canada Netherlands Botswana Nigeria Gambia, The 
Switzerland Norway Chile Nicaragua Guinea-Bissau 
China New Zealand Cameroon Oman Cambodia 
Czech Republic Poland Colombia Pakistan Lao PDR 
Germany Portugal Cabo Verde Peru Lesotho 
Denmark Romania Cyprus Philippines Madagascar 
Spain Russian Federation Dominican Republic Papua New Guinea Mali 
Estonia Saudi Arabia Algeria Paraguay Mozambique 
Finland Serbia Ecuador Singapore Mauritania 
France Slovak Republic Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Malawi 
United Kingdom Slovenia Fiji Swaziland Niger 
Greece Sweden Gabon Seychelles Nepal 
Croatia Turkey Georgia Syrian Arab Republic Rwanda 
Hungary Ukraine Ghana Thailand Sudan 
Indonesia United States Guatemala Tajikistan Senegal 
India South Africa Guyana Tunisia Sierra Leone 
Ireland  Honduras Uruguay Chad 
Italy  Iran, Islamic Rep. Venezuela, RB Tanzania 
Japan  Israel Zimbabwe Uganda 
  Jordan  Yemen, Rep. 
  Kazakhstan  
   Kenya  
   Kyrgyz Republic  
   Kuwait  
 Note: Based on the World Bank Classification (WDI, 2015)  
Additionally, as the existing literature indicates, the underlying assumptions about the channels 
of influence between military spending and economic growth determine the econometric 
specification and thus guide the expected outcome. Since there is no standard framework into which 
the empirical work can be based, we make no such prior assumptions and we will interpret ex post 
our findings association with these theories. Furthermore, all previous studies with a large number 
of countries that reach into the 2000s look into only one type of relationship, namely either the 
long-run or the short-run and hence their results have difficulty to be interpreted.  
Prior to any analysis, we perform the necessary step to identify the integration properties of our 
series. For robustness we use three panel data unit root tests, which cover both the individual and 
the common unit root identification: (i) Breitung (2000) unit root test that applies a common unit 
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root test to the entire panel data sample after removing the autoregressive part and transforming 
and detrending the standardised proxies, (ii) Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) unit root test that 
investigates the individual Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests prior to combining them to 
acquire the overall test statistics, and (iii) a Fisher-type unit root test developed by Maddala and Wu 
(1999) and Choi (2001) that combines the p-values from individual ADF unit root tests using Fisher's 
(1932) results. 
Once we ensure the I(1) order of the variables, and in order to examine the existence of a long-
run relationship between military spending and economic growth as well as the direction of such 
relationship we utilise co-integration analysis tests. As one of the limitations in the previous studies 
was the choice of the estimation method and not all alternative estimation techniques provide with 
the same outcome, we will employ a range of panel data co-integration tests with different 
statistical attributes for robustness and more well-defined results. Hence, the co-integration analysis 
comprises of five methodologies: (i) Pedroni (1999, 2004), (ii) Kao (1999), (iii) Johansen-Fisher test 
(Maddala and Wu, 1999), (iv) Stock and Watson (1993) also known as Dynamic Ordinary Least 
Squares (DOLS), (v) Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) from Pedroni (2000)). The last 
two methodologies can be performed only when we have clear indication from the first three tests 
that co-integration is present and they can provide with information on the numerical impact of one 
magnitude to the other. Additionally, the DOLS and FMOLS tests are estimated with constant trend 
to capture the common global movements. To conclude the long-run investigation we employ a 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation (Pesaran et al., 1999) that like the other two approaches 
allows for the heterogeneity of the cross sections but follows a pooled approach. For the 
investigation of the short-run relationship along with the direction of the relationship we use 
Granger Causality tests and the short-run estimators of the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) that as 
mentioned earlier gives us the pooled approach.  
Additionally, we repeat the aforementioned analysis for the period 1998-2006, which is the 
period that is covered from the existing studies in order to look into whether there is a change after 
the economic crisis started in a consistent way with the remaining analysis. 
 
4. Empirical Evidence 
The main requirement prior to running any of the long-run and short-run evaluation tests is to 
check the stationarity of the variables as the use of non-stationary processes can lead to a spurious 
regression. We employed three panel unit root tests (Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), 
and a Fisher-type test developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001)) and from all these 
10 
 
tests we can deduce that both variables are non-stationary in levels, while they become stationary 
when examined in first differences. Subsequently, both variables can be described as I(1). The results 
of the unit root tests can be found in Table A in the Appendix.  
The examination for the long-run relationship consists of five co-integration methodologies 
(Pedroni (1999, 2004), Kao (1999), Johansen-Fisher, Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS), Fully 
Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS)) and the estimation of Pooled Group Mean model by 
Pesaran (1999) (PMG/ARDL) for robustness. Table B in the Appendix contains all analytical relevant 
results, whilst Tables 2, 3 and 4 give a schematic summary of the findings for the period 1988-2013. 
The first three co-integration tests, that are presented in Table 2, do not provide with the direction 
of causality but they indicate that there is co-integration for all groups of countries. The number of 
tests that indicate presence of co-integration out of the seven Pedroni’s (1999, 2004) tests are given 
in parenthesis, but one should look carefully at which of the tests signal co-integration, as the 
econometric literature considers more powerful the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Philip 
Peron (PP) tests (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2007). Based on the estimated tests there is clear evidence 
of bidirectional causality only for the groups of developing countries and the entire sample (though 
the evidence for the entire sample for the direction from the military spending to economic growth 
is weaker), whilst there is no influence to either direction for the least developed countries. For the 
group of developed countries there is only influence from the economic growth to military spending. 
For the cases that co-integration is present, we proceed with the estimation of DOLS and FMOLS 
with constant trend where we find that the impact is positive and especially in the case of 
developing countries the impact is much stronger from the economic growth to military spending 
than the other way around.  
Table 2:  Summary of Co-integration tests (Long run ): 1988-2013 
Test Type All countries Developed Countries Developing Countries Least Developed 
Countries 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 (4/7) MSP & GDP: 𝑛𝑜 (3/7) MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 (6/7) MSP & GDP: 𝑛𝑜 (3/7) 
Kao (1999)  MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
Johansen-Fisher  MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
Notes: (1) The parenthesis in the Pedroni’s (1999, 2004) tests give the number of tests that a co-integrated relationship exists out of the 7 
tests.   
(2) *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
The numerical evaluation of the impact is reported in the parenthesis of the relevant rows in 
Table 3, but the reported numbers should be treated with caution; coefficients for the same group 
should not be compared across methods as each method has different measurement estimation 
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method; however, coefficients from the same test can be compared across groups. Thus, we notice 
that in the direction of economic growth towards military spending the stronger impact is for the 
developing than for the developed countries. We also notice that when bi-directional causality is 
present, the impact of the economic growth to military spending is noticeably stronger than the 
reverse. The estimates of the PGM model indicate bi-directional influence for all groups of countries 
except the developing countries where only economic growth impacts the military spending.  
Table 3: Summary of DOLS, FMOLS, PMG tests (Long run): 1988-2013 
Test Type All countries Developed Countries Developing Countries Least Developed 
Countries 
DOLS  
 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.06 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.74***) 
n/a  
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.91***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.10***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (1.02***) 
n/a  
n/a 
FMOLS  
 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.06 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.74***) 
n/a  
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.72***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.05 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.59***) 
n/a  
n/a 
PMG MSP 
+
→GDP (0.51 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.86***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP(0.14 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP(0.48***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.60***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.47***) 
MSP →  GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP 
+
→MSP(0.67***) 
Notes: (1) *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
(2)) No comparison of the results should be attempted across tests as they do not refer to the same estimated measurements. The 
numerical values in parenthesis should only be compared across groups of data for the same test.  
(3) n/a: non-applicable; the impact is estimated only when the first three tests indicate co-integration. 
In the short-run analysis the Granger causality tests indicate that there is influence only from the 
economic growth to military spending for all groups except for the group of least developed 
countries where no causality is found. The PGM short-run estimation signals no causality for all 
directions and groups except a rather weak -though positive one- from military spending to 
economic growth for the entire sample with the quantified impact reported in the parenthesis of the 
relevant row in Table 4. 
Table 4: Summary of Causality tests (Short run ): 1988-2013 
Test Type All countries Developed Countries Developing Countries Least Developed 
Countries 
Granger Causality 
MSP → GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
MSP → GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
MSP → GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
MSP → GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →  MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
PMG MSP 
+
→GDP (0.03 ***) 
GDP →MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
MSP→GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
MSP→ GDP: 𝑛𝑜 
GDP →MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
MSP→GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
Note:  (1) *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Next we repeat the previous analysis for the period of 1988-2006, which on one hand is 
comparable with the existing literature and on the other hand allows us to evaluate the impact of 
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the recent economic crisis to the interaction between military spending and economic growth. The 
findings are summarised in Table 5, and in general following the Pedroni’s (1999, 2004) and Kao’s 
(1999) results we find evidence of bidirectional causality for all groups and not only for the 
developing countries as it was found earlier. Also, the quantification of this interaction (see Table 6) 
resulted to the impact being positive and as before the impact is much stronger from the economic 
growth to military spending than the other way around. We notice that when looking at the 
influence of military spending towards economic growth, the stronger impact is for the developing 
countries and the weakest is for the least developed countries. For the least developed group of 
countries the military spending as a percentage of GDP is steadily reducing since 2006 and that 
might explain the earlier finding of no causality between the two magnitudes. However, the PMG 
methodology finds evidence of causal effect in less cases than in the more extended time period and 
identifies the presence of interaction from military spending to economic growth only for the 
developing countries and the reverse relationship for all the other groups. 
Table 5: Summary of Co-integration tests (Long run ): 1988-2006 
Test Type All countries Developed Countries Developing Countries Least Developed 
Countries 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 (5/7) MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 (4/7) MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 (5/7) MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 (5/7) 
Kao (1999)  MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
Johansen-Fisher  MSP & GDP: 𝑛𝑜 MSP & GDP: 𝑛𝑜 MSP & GDP: 𝑛𝑜 MSP & GDP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠  
Notes: (1) The parenthesis in the Pedroni’s (1999, 2004) tests give the number of tests that a co-integrated relationship exists out of the 7 tests.   
(2) *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
 
Table 6: Summary of DOLS, FMOLS, PMG tests (Long run): 1988-2006 
Test Type All countries Developed Countries Developing Countries Least Developed 
Countries 
DOLS  
 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.07 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (1.06***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.12 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.84***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.10***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (1.11***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.04 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (1.09***) 
FMOLS 
 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.05***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.94***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.06 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.85***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.10 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (0.75***) 
MSP 
+
→GDP (0.02 ***) 
GDP 
+
→MSP (1.45***) 
PMG 
MSP→GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: (0.76***) 
MSP→GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: (0.82***) 
MSP→ GDP: (0.60***) 
GDP →MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
MSP→GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: (1.13***) 
Notes: (1) *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
(2)) No comparison of the results should be attempted across tests as they do not refer to the same estimated measurements. The 
numerical values in parenthesis should only be compared across groups of data for the same test.  
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In the context of the short-run analysis (see Table 7)) the Granger causality tests suggest that 
there is casual effect only from the economic growth to military spending for all groups except the 
group of the least developed countries where no causality is found, and the PGM methodology 
indicate no causality except in the case of developing countries from economic growth to military 
spending.  
Table 7: Summary of Causality tests (Short run ): 1988-2006 
Test Type All countries Developed Countries Developing Countries Least Developed 
Countries 
Granger Causality 
MSP→ GDP: 𝑛𝑜 
GDP →MSP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
MSP→ GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
MSP→  GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
MSP→ GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP→ MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
PMG 
MSP→GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
MSP→GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
MSP→ GDP: 𝑛𝑜 
GDP →MSP: (0.03***) 
MSP→GDP: 𝑛𝑜  
GDP →MSP: 𝑛𝑜 
Note:  (1) *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
 
5. Implications and Concluding Remarks 
This paper looks into the dynamic interaction between military spending and economic growth 
during the period 1988-2013 that includes the recent years of economic crisis and covering 138 
countries. As indicated by the existing literature, the adoption of a theoretical channel of how 
military spending influences economic growth will guide the econometric specification of the model 
and might influence the outcome and thus we avoid such prior assumptions. Additionally, we are not 
limited to single estimation method but we employ a wide range of tests that are applicable to this 
type of data set and allows us to form a complete picture of the interaction. Based on the empirical 
evidence in the previous section there is a variety of outcomes that spur from different 
methodologies that if viewed in isolation might lead to different conclusions. Therefore the 
variability of the results enforce our view that it is essential to look into a range of tests and draw 
conclusions from all of them rather than adopt one type of tests or methodology and deduce 
implications from them as each test is looking into other aspects of estimation issues.  
In general, when we look into the period of 1988-2006, which is the period that is comparable 
with the most recent studies, we find no causality in the sort-run from the military spending to 
economic growth but there is some evidence of causality from economic growth to military spending 
for the groups of developed and developing countries as well as the entire group. 
As the period is expanded to include the economic crisis years and thus covering the period 
1988-2013, the short-run analysis results remain about the same but in the long-run only the group 
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of developing countries experiences a bidirectional causality with the side of economic growth to 
military spending being affected by far the most. There is no interaction for the least developed 
countries and regarding the remaining groups the interaction is positive but only running from the 
economic growth towards the military spending. It is notable that during the last decade on the 
average the military spending as percentage of GDP is close to or below the 2% for the developed 
and least developed countries, whilst the developing countries have an average military spending 
well above 3.5% closer to 4% of GDP. Perhaps, for the military spending to have any significant 
impact on the economic growth of a country, it needs to be over a certain percentage of GDP. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis environment might have created additional needs for the society 
that increase the opportunity cost of military spending and hence its influence on the economic 
growth appears diminished.  
Over the years the vast majority of the research has been focusing on the impact of military 
spending on economic growth and the theoretical channels of it. However, it seems that the 
causality is stronger the other way around. As a country’s economic growth is established, more 
government funds become available and after the financing of other pressing needs for education, 
health, etc. is ensured, the government finds the monetary resources to finance and promote 
foreign policy targets, build defences against real or perceived threats, expand its influence via 
peace keeping operations and actively participate into multinational defence groups. The increase in 
military spending could also trigger the ‘military keynesianism’ mechanism, which is the most 
probable explanation for the positive impact of military spending on economic growth in developing 
countries even after the start of the economic crisis but not for the developed countries that are 
perceived to be more efficient. It is also possible that over time, whilst the economy enjoys positive 
economic growth, in the long-run the society is adjusted to the military spending by infusing some 
services of the military into the civilian life for example through R&D, which in return fuels further 
economic growth. Finally, the lack of any dynamic interaction for the least developed countries once 
the economic crisis years are taken into sample might be due that on one hand the military spending 
is both low numerically and a small percentage of their GDP, and on the other hand any military 
spending fails to trigger the ‘military keynesianism’ mechanism as they usually suffer from a higher 
degree of inefficiency in their government spending process, which is usually influenced by a higher 
level of corruption, which in turn allows the presence of interest-groups composed of individuals, 
firms and organisations to benefit from defence spending regardless of the country’s actual needs 
and hence overall the military spending not to be efficient and beneficial in its contribution to 
economic growth. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Summary of Panel Unit Root Tests (1988-2013) 
  
Breitung Im, Pesaran  
and Shin  
ADF - 
Fisher 
All countries 
   GDP 7.616 0.108 1.428 
MSP  1.610 -0.908 -0.037 
ΔGDP -13.627 *** -24.382 *** -21.194 *** 
ΔMSP -11.697 *** -29.748 *** -29.071 *** 
Developed 
   GDP 4.282 1.237 1.746 
MSP 1.058 -1.109 0.224 
ΔGDP -9.514 *** -12.340 *** 328.391 *** 
ΔMSP -12.221 *** -20.365 *** 575.982 *** 
Developing 
   GDP 3.097 -1.657 2.192 
MSP 1.254 -0.713 -0.339 
ΔGDP -6.448 *** -15.364 *** 460.233 *** 
ΔMSP -7.288 *** -14.446 *** 538.756 *** 
Least Developed 
   GDP 7.667 -0.343 66.090 
MSP 0.260 0.544 56.043 
ΔGDP -11.848 *** -14.739 *** 286.749 *** 
ΔMSP -4.635 *** -10.191 *** 236.063 *** 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
  
  
16 
 
 
Table B: Panel Co-integration Tests (1988-2013) 
 
All countries Developed Developing Least Developed 
Pedroni's Panel Cointegration test 
   Panel v-Statistic 7.004 *** 0.588 3.663 *** 2.328 ** 
Panel rho-Statistic -4.173 *** -3.444 *** -1.808 ** 0.610 
Panel PP-Statistic -5.761 *** 8.554 *** -8.679 *** -1.649 ** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -6.358 *** -9.420 *** -7.242 *** -1.731 ** 
Group rho-Statistic -0.094 0.899 2.874 2.488 
Group PP-Statistic -9.689 *** -4.877 *** -2.320 ** -0.063 
Group ADF-Statistic -10.305 *** -5.825 *** -2.878 *** 0.486 
Kao's Panel Co-integration Test 
   ADF 3.190 *** -7.437 *** 1.755 ** 3.016 *** 
Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
   Hypothesized Number of CE(s): None 
Fisher Stat. (from trace test) 727.6 *** 250.9 *** 328.3 *** 148.4 *** 
Fisher Stat. (from max-eigen test) 680.7 *** 235.0 *** 307.1 *** 138.6 *** 
Hypothesized Number of CE(s): At most 1 
Fisher Stat. (from trace test) 279.3 99.17 123 57.06 
Fisher Stat. (from max-eigen test) 279.3 99.17 123 57.06 
Dynamic OLS Estimation Results 
   
GDP → MSP 
0.740 *** 
(0.047) 
0.906 *** 
(00073) 
1.022 *** 
(0.075) - 
MSP → GDP 
0.064 *** 
(0.004) - 
0.101 *** 
(0.011) - 
Fully Modified OLS Estimation Results 
   
GDP → MSP 
0.743 *** 
(0.011) 
0.718 *** 
(0.017) 
0.592 *** 
(0.0174) - 
MSP → GDP 
0.067 ** 
(0.014) - 
0.054 ** 
(0.023) - 
Pooled Mean Group / AR Distributed Lag Models 
   
GDP → MSP 
0.918 *** 
(0.057) 
0.481 *** 
(0.064) 
0.479 *** 
(0.042) 
0.672 *** 
(0.099) 
MSP → GDP 
0.505 *** 
(0.025) 
0.144 *** 
(0.017) 
0.597 *** 
(0.046) - 
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
          The standard errors are given in parenthesis where applicable. 
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